2009 – 2015美国康奈尔大学哲学博士（Cornell University）

2008 – 2009美国Hope College哲学系访问学生

2005 – 2009武汉大学哲学学士（比较哲学国际班）

认识论

Publications

Book

(2023)Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism.Cambridge:Cambridge

University Press.

Papers

(forthcoming) The Value of Evidence in Decision-Making.The Journal of

Philosophy.

(forthcoming) It Can Be Rational to Change Priors.Analysis.

(forthcoming) The Dogmatism Puzzle.The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology,3rd edition.

(2024) Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Erkenntnis.

(2023)Permissivism, The Value of Rationality, and a Convergence-Theoretic

Epistemology.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research106, 157-175.

(2023) (Review) The Rational Mind, by Scott Sturgeon.Mind, 132(527), 871-880

(2023）认知宽容论综述.《哲学评鉴》（第二辑), 119-133.

(2021) "The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism."Episteme18(4), 654-

673.

(2020) "Higher-Order Defeat and Intellectual Responsibility."Synthese197 (12):

5435-5455.

(2020) "A New Causal-Doxastic Theory of Basing." In Pat Bondy and Adam Cart-er(eds.)Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing

Relation. Routledge.

(2016) “Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.”Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy94 (3): 563-575.

(2015) "Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality."Australasian Journal of

Philosophy93 (1): 93-108.

Professional Service

Referee:

Nous, Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical

Studies, Philosophers Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Synthese,

Ergo, Erkenntnis, American Philosophical Quaterly, Episteme

Editor:

Guest editor for the topical collection “Current Themes in Epistemology:

Asian Epistemology Network” in Asian Journal of Philosophy.